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OPINION 
__________________ 
 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 
A jury impaneled in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania convicted Michael Tyrone Waller of being a 
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 
922(g)(1), possessing heroin with the intent to distribute, in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing 
a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).  On appeal, Waller 
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contends that the District Court committed reversible error in 
administering its instructions to the jury.  We agree and will, 
therefore, vacate the judgment of conviction and remand the 
case to the District Court for a new trial. 
 
I. 
 
 At 3:30 in the morning on March 31, 2008, Officers 
Saldutte and Matson, on patrol in their police cruiser, pulled 
behind a Cadillac that was stopped at a red light in a high 
crime area of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  The officers 
observed that the Cadillac had a burned out brake light and 
multiple obstructions hanging from its rear view mirror, both 
of which are ―purported violations of the Motor Vehicle 
Code.‖  Appendix (―App.‖) 149.  Accordingly, the officers 
activated emergency lights and sirens, and the Cadillac 
immediately pulled over.  From his seat in the police cruiser, 
Officer Saldutte saw Waller, the Cadillac‘s passenger, turn 
around and look over his left shoulder in the officers‘ 
direction.  When Waller turned back to face the windshield, 
he leaned over to his left as if he was ―reaching down into his 
waistband or the middle of the seat.‖  App. 153.  Officer 
Saldutte believed he was retrieving or concealing a firearm.  
The driver of the vehicle, DeAngelo Hays, was also moving 
around inside the car.   
 
Officer Saldutte approached the driver‘s side of the 
Cadillac while Officer Matson remained in the cruiser.  
Officer Ewing, who observed the stop from his own patrol car 
and came to assist, approached the passenger‘s side.  Hays 
appeared nervous as Officer Saldutte explained the reason for 
the stop to him, so Saldutte asked him to step out of the car to 
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undergo a pat-down.  Saldutte found no weapons, however, 
and promptly instructed Hays to reenter the car.   
 
In the meantime, Officer Ewing had detected a bulge 
under Waller‘s clothing at his right hip.  He therefore asked 
Waller to step out of the car so that he could conduct a pat-
down.  Upon feeling a weapon under Waller‘s waistband, 
Officer Ewing yelled ―gun‖ to get the attention of his fellow 
officers.  This excited Waller, causing him to ―push off the 
vehicle‖ and ―tustle‖ with Officer Ewing.  App. 176.  In an 
attempt to subdue the now excited Waller, Officer Ewing 
wrapped his arms around Waller‘s waist.  Officer Saldutte 
came over to assist, grabbing Waller‘s right arm to prevent 
him from reaching for the gun.  Officer Ewing then did a leg 
sweep, causing all three men to fall to the ground.  While on 
the ground, Officer Saldutte yelled to Officer Ewing that he 
believed Waller to be attempting to reach for the gun in his 
waistband.  Perceiving this as a threat, Officer Ewing 
―delivered two elbow strikes to [Waller‘s] face,‖ and Officer 
Saldutte ―delivered a series of punches to the right side of 
Waller‘s face.‖  App. 160-61, 177.  At that point, Waller 
capitulated stating, ―okay, I‘m done.‖  App. 161.  He 
submitted to arrest without further incident.   
 
In the course of conducting a search incident to arrest, 
Officer Ewing found a .38 caliber revolver, loaded with six 
rounds of ammunition, in the waistband of Waller‘s pants.  
From Waller‘s jacket pocket, Officer Ewing recovered a 
plastic baggie containing fifty-two individual stamp bags of 
heroin marked ―Shoot, Shoot Them,‖ App. 162, 171, which 
were bundled into four groups of ten and one group of twelve.  
The police did not find any other indicia of drug use, such as 
needles, syringes, bottle caps, spoons, lighters, or track 
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marks, on Waller.  Neither did they find any other indicia of 
drug distribution, such as United States currency, a cell 
phone, or owe sheets — lists typically used by drug dealers to 
keep record of which customers owe them money at any 
given time.
1
  At the time of Waller‘s arrest, Officer Saldutte 
believed Waller‘s eyes and skin color looked normal.  And 
neither Officer Ewing nor Officer Matson believed Waller to 
have been under the influence of drugs.  Officer Ewing, 
however, did describe Waller‘s actions as ―[m]ore slow.  
Attitude was like slow speech.‖  App. 180.  The officers did 
not observe Waller selling heroin, and the Government never 
offered evidence that he had done so at any time.  The total 
weight of the heroin seized from Waller was 1.63 grams.  To 
conceptualize the amount, defense counsel noted that a packet 
of Equal sugar weighs one gram.   
 
The Government charged Waller with possession of a 
firearm by a convicted felon, possession with intent to 
distribute heroin, and possession of a firearm in furtherance 
of a drug trafficking crime.  At trial, Waller admitted guilt as 
to the first count, and he admitted that he possessed the heroin 
in question.  As such, the only contested issue was whether 
Waller possessed the heroin (and, therefore, the gun) in 
furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  
 
To prove that Waller had the requisite intent to deliver 
the heroin the Government relied on the expert testimony of 
Pennsylvania State Police Trooper Michael Warfield.  
Trooper Warfield explained that heroin is typically packaged 
                                              
1
 Similarly, there was no evidence that the police ever 
searched Waller‘s residence to determine whether he kept 
paraphernalia typical of drug dealers there. 
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and sold in glassine baggies, called stamp bags.  Heroin can 
be snorted or it can be heated into a liquid, placed into a 
syringe and injected into a vein.  Although Trooper Warfield 
was not sure how snorting heroin feels in comparison to 
injecting it, he opined that ―it‘s not as strong of an effect.‖  
App. 215.  And he believed that addicts progress from 
snorting to shooting heroin.  He further testified that heroin 
users gradually need increasing amounts of heroin to achieve 
the same high.  Finally, he noted that an addict who goes 
without heroin for any length of time becomes physically 
sick, whereas addicts who have recently taken the drug 
generally possess a calm demeanor.   
 
Trooper Warfield estimated that each stamp bag in 
Waller‘s possession would sell for between $10.00 and 
$20.00, making the total value of the heroin found on his 
person approximately $500.00 to $1,000.00.  Trooper 
Warfield stated that he had ―never met no one who was 
addicted to heroin to have fifty-two bags‖ on him at one time.  
App. 243-44.  Nevertheless, he acknowledged that addicts can 
use anywhere from five to ten bags a day.  Thus, a weeks‘ 
worth of heroin for one addict could be between thirty-five 
and seventy stamp bags, and there were two people in the car.  
Trooper Warfield further stated that heroin addicts do not 
commonly possess firearms.  But he later qualified this 
testimony, explaining that addicts often have firearms in order 
to trade them for drugs.  In contrast, he stated, drug dealers 
frequently carry loaded firearms for protection.  Lastly, 
Trooper Warfield opined that a dealer would not typically 
carry his cutting agents and owe sheets with him when out on 
the streets.   
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After hearing this evidence, the jury returned a guilty 
verdict on each of the three counts.  This appeal of the 
conviction timely followed. 
 
II. 
 
  The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
over the District Court‘s final judgment of conviction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
On appeal, Waller asserts that the District Court 
committed reversible constitutional error in administering its 
jury instruction on the issue of intent.  Where, as here, a party 
has timely objected at trial to a jury instruction given by the 
district court, our review of the legal standard expressed in 
the instruction is plenary.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 
62, 74 (3d Cir. 2008).  Should we deem the instruction given 
to be legally proper, we review the district court‘s refusal to 
give any other particular instruction only for an abuse of 
discretion.  Id.  In so conducting our review, ―we consider the 
totality of the instructions and not a particular sentence or 
paragraph in isolation.‖  Id. at 74-75 (quotation marks 
omitted).   
 
We subject any constitutional defect in the jury 
instructions to a harmless error analysis.   By this standard, a 
constitutional error requires reversal unless it can be 
―prove[d] beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.‖  
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).   As we have 
previously made clear, ―the relevant question under Chapman 
is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a 
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guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether 
the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error.‖  Gov‘t of the V.I. v. Martinez, 
620 F.3d 321, 337 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).  
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
The Government contended at trial that Waller was a 
low-level drug dealer who possessed the 1.63 grams of heroin 
found on his person for the purpose of selling it to others.  
The defense maintained, however, that Waller was merely a 
drug addict, who intended to make personal use of the 1.63 
grams of heroin that he admittedly possessed.  The defense 
thus proceeded on the theory that Waller was not guilty of 
possessing the heroin with the intent to deliver; rather, he was 
guilty only of the lesser-included offense of simple 
possession.  And if the jury agreed that he was guilty only of 
simple possession, it must further conclude that he had not 
possessed the gun in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.  
Having no direct evidence bearing on the only contested issue 
at trial — Waller‘s intent — both parties relied entirely on 
circumstantial evidence to support their theories of the case. 
 
At the conclusion of the evidence, the District Court 
provided the jury with the following instruction on intent, 
with which Waller takes issue: 
 
Intent ordinarily may not be 
proved directly because there is not a 
way of fathoming or scrutinizing the 
operation of the human mind.  However, 
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you may infer a defendant‘s intent from 
all of the surrounding circumstances.  
For example, in determining whether a 
defendant has had the intent to distribute 
controlled substances, you may consider, 
among other things, the quantity of the 
controlled substances involved and the 
amount of cash involved.  You may also 
consider any statements made or omitted 
by the defendant, as well as all other 
facts and circumstances in evidence 
which demonstrate the defendant‘s state 
of mind. 
 
App. 267 (emphasis added).  Waller contends that, in 
permitting the jury to consider any ―statements made or 
omitted by the defendant,‖ the District Court improperly 
invited the jury to infer intent from Waller‘s post-arrest, post–
Miranda
2
 warnings silence, in violation of his right to due 
process under the Fifth Amendment and the rule announced 
in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976).
3
  For the reasons 
set forth below, we agree. 
                                              
2
 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966). 
 
3
 The Government interprets Waller‘s argument to encompass 
both his right to post-arrest, post-Miranda silence and his 
right to silence at trial.  This is not so.  Waller concedes that 
the District Court‘s instructions, when viewed in their 
entirety, made clear to the jury that Waller had an absolute 
right not to testify or offer any evidence at trial.  Waller 
argues only that the District Court‘s instructions improperly 
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Before we turn to the merits of Waller‘s constitutional 
claim, however, we address the favorable comparisons that 
have been drawn between the instruction given by the District 
Court and two different model instructions on intent.  The 
Government suggests that these comparisons are of use in 
evaluating the propriety of the District Court‘s instruction in 
this case.  We disagree.   
 
First, we turn to the District Court‘s comparison of its 
own instruction to this Court‘s Pattern Instruction on intent.  
Waller timely objected to the challenged instruction at trial 
and, in so doing, proposed a curative instruction to clarify 
that, in referring to ―statements made or omitted,‖ the District 
Court intended to refer only to statements and omissions from 
statements that the defendant made before his arrest.
4
  The 
                                                                                                     
permitted the jury to consider his failure to make a statement 
prior to trial.  See Waller Br. 13, 16, 20. 
 
4
 Specifically, Waller suggested that the District Court clarify 
that, by the phrase ―statements made or omitted,‖ the court  
 
refers only to statements and omissions 
from statements which a defendant 
makes before his arrest.  As you 
deliberate, you may not consider as 
evidence of guilt on Count Two the fact 
that the defendant did not make a 
statement following the March 31, 2008 
arrest.  Just as the defendant has a right 
to remain silent and not testify at trial, 
the defendant has a right to remain silent 
out of Court.  And the fact that the 
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District Court, however, declined to alter its instruction, 
reasoning that the instruction given was ―very similar to the 
Third Circuit model charge‖ on intent.  App. 278.   
 
The District Court is indeed correct in its assertion that 
the Third Circuit‘s Pattern Instruction on intent is only 
minimally different from the challenged instruction in this 
case.  But that minimal difference is of great legal 
significance.  The Pattern Instruction conspicuously refrains 
from employing the very language that Waller argued was 
objectionable in the District Court‘s instruction.  Specifically, 
our Pattern Instruction provides: 
 
[T]o determine [the defendant‘s] state of 
mind (what [the defendant] intended or 
knew) at a particular time, you may 
consider evidence about what [the 
defendant] said, what [the defendant] did 
and failed to do, how [the defendant] 
acted, and all other facts and 
circumstances shown by the evidence 
that may prove what was in [the 
defendant‘s] mind at that time.   
 
Third Circuit Model Criminal Jury Instructions, ch. 5.01 
(emphasis omitted).  Thus, the Pattern Instruction permits the 
                                                                                                     
defendant did not make a statement, 
either in or out of Court, may not be 
considered by you or even discussed in 
your deliberations.  
 
App. 277-78.    
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jury to take into account only those statements actually made 
by the defendant, as well as the defendant‘s failures to act, 
both of which are decidedly proper for the jury to consider in 
determining whether a defendant possessed the necessary 
intent to commit the crime charged.  See, e.g., United States 
v. Mendez-Zamora, 296 F.3d 1013, 1018 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(―To suggest that a person‘s state of mind can be inferred 
from his omissions (as well as his acts) is merely to utter 
common sense.  We fail to see how the instruction reduces 
the government‘s burden to prove all elements of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt or how it in any way compels a 
defendant to incriminate himself.‖).  The Pattern Instruction 
does not invite the jury to consider statements omitted by the 
defendant, or otherwise comment on the defendant‘s failure to 
speak.  Accordingly, any similarities that may exist between 
the District Court‘s instruction and this Court‘s Pattern 
Instruction are immaterial to whether the challenged portion 
of the instruction employed in this case raises constitutional 
concerns.   
 
Second, the Government asserts that the District 
Court‘s instruction cannot be improper because, in United 
States v. Garrett, 574 F.2d 778, 783 (3d Cir. 1978), we 
approved the language of the model instruction contained in 1 
Devitt & Blackmar, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions: 
Criminal, § 14.13 (1977), on which the District Court‘s 
instruction was based.  Gov‘t Br. 16.  This argument, too, is 
unavailing.   
 
In Garrett, we considered the question of whether an 
instruction on intent, which created a presumption that a 
defendant intended the natural and probable consequences of 
his actions, impermissibly shifted the burden to the defendant 
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to prove that he was not guilty.  See Garrett, 574 F.3d at 782.  
And in so considering the challenged portion of that 
instruction, we suggested only that the language from Devitt 
& Blackmar § 14.13 ―may be of some help to trial judges in 
avoiding the use of instructions on intent that might be 
construed by a jury to shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant in a criminal case.‖  Id. at 783.  We were not asked, 
and thus we did not address, whether the Devitt & Blackmar 
instruction would be of the same help to trial judges in 
preserving an accused‘s right to silence.  Thus, our decision 
in Garrett contributes little of value to the present analysis.   
 
With these issues settled, we turn to the merits of 
Waller‘s constitutional claim. 
 
B. 
 
The Fifth Amendment provides that ―no person…shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.‖  U.S. Const. amend. V.  In order to give full effect 
to this privilege against self-incrimination, the Supreme Court 
has made clear that the Fifth Amendment permits neither 
comment by the prosecution on the accused's silence at trial 
nor instructions by the court that such silence is evidence of 
guilt.  Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965); see 
also United States v. Isaac, 134 F.3d 199, 206 (3d Cir. 1998).  
The Fifth Amendment necessarily so forbids because any 
other rule would impermissibly penalize the exercise of the 
constitutional privilege; it would ―cut[] down on the privilege 
by making its assertion costly.‖  Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
 
As a means of safeguarding the privilege against self-
incrimination prior to trial, the Supreme Court announced, in 
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Miranda v. Arizona, the now ubiquitous rule that an accused 
must be warned, upon being taken into custody, ―that he has a 
right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may 
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the 
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.‖  384 
U.S. at 444.  The Supreme Court subsequently made clear in 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976), that once these 
prophylactic Miranda warnings have been given, the Due 
Process Clause forbids the ―prosecutor to cause the jury to 
draw an impermissible inference of guilt from a defendant‘s 
post-arrest silence.‖  Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 
947 (3d Cir. 1998).  This must be so because ―Miranda 
warnings carry the Government‘s ‗implicit assurance‘ that an 
arrestee‘s invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to remain 
silent will not later be used against him.‖  Martinez, 620 F.3d 
at 335.  And ―[b]ecause a defendant‘s post-Miranda 
warning[s] silence could be nothing more than an invocation 
of his right to silence, it would be fundamentally unfair to 
permit a breach of that assurance by allowing‖ his failure to 
give an exculpatory account to the police after receiving the 
warnings to be invoked later as inculpatory evidence against 
him.  Id.  
 
The Supreme Court‘s holding in Doyle that the 
prosecutor may not cause the jury to draw an impermissible 
inference of guilt based on the defendant‘s post–Miranda 
warnings silence necessarily implies that the trial court is so 
forbidden as well.  Cf. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613 (holding that 
neither the prosecutor nor the trial court may adversely 
comment on a defendant‘s silence at trial).  And indeed, the 
Government readily concedes that, in light of the Supreme 
Court‘s admonishment in Doyle that ―[s]ilence in the wake of 
[Miranda] warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee‘s 
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exercise of these Miranda rights,‖ 426 U.S. at 617, ―a jury 
cannot, as a matter of due process, consider a defendant‘s 
silence post-Miranda warnings[.]‖  Gov‘t Br. 24.  
Nonetheless, the Government argues that the District Court‘s 
instruction permitting the jury to consider ―statements made 
or omitted by the defendant‖ did not violate the rule of Doyle 
because it only allowed the jury to take account of Waller‘s 
pre-arrest silence.
5
  The challenged phrase, the argument 
goes, permitted the jury to consider only omissions from 
statements that were in evidence.  And because the evidence 
presented at trial ended at the moment that Waller was 
arrested, the instruction could not possibly have implicated 
Waller‘s failure to make a post–Miranda warnings statement.  
We disagree. 
 
To begin, we cannot accept the Government‘s 
assertion that the jury clearly would have understood the 
District Court‘s instruction to refer only to omissions from 
statements for which there was evidence presented at trial.  
The relevant portion of the instruction told the jury that it 
―may also consider any statements made or omitted by the 
                                              
5
 We note that this argument relies substantially on an 
assumption that the use of Waller‘s pre-arrest silence as 
substantive evidence of guilt would give rise to no 
constitutional concerns.  It is not entirely clear that this is so.  
See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(collecting cases).  Nonetheless, we need not resolve this 
issue because the District Court‘s instruction is reasonably 
construed as a comment on the defendant‘s post–Miranda 
warnings silence, and the Government readily concedes that 
any such comment by the court is constitutionally infirm.  
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defendant, as well as all other facts and circumstances in 
evidence which demonstrate the defendant‘s state of mind.‖  
The Government contends that the phrase ―in evidence‖ 
modifies the first clause of the sentence, as well as the second 
clause.  But the defendant did not believe the instruction to be 
entirely lucid in that regard, as evidenced by his request for a 
curative instruction, and neither do we.  We think it at least 
equally reasonable to interpret the two clauses of the sentence 
to be independently operative, first inviting the jury to 
consider — without any temporal limitation — all statements 
that the defendant made or failed to make, then inviting the 
jury to consider any other relevant facts of which it was 
presented with evidence at trial. 
 
Moreover, the fact that there was no evidence of a 
post-Miranda statement presented at trial is precisely why the 
instruction, which allowed the jury to consider statements that 
Waller did not make, is problematic.  The Government 
suggests that the absence of evidence demonstrating that 
Waller failed to make a post-Miranda statement somehow 
operated to prevent the jurors from pondering why they were 
not presented with evidence affirmatively demonstrating that 
Waller did give a post-Miranda statement.  But, in fact, the 
absence of such evidence is likely have had quite the opposite 
effect when combined with an instruction from the District 
Court that expressly encouraged the jurors to speculate as to 
statements that the defendant could have made, but did not.
6
   
                                              
6
 Additionally, as Waller aptly points out, it would have in 
fact been error for the Government to offer into evidence any 
testimony that Waller refused to make a statement after he 
received Miranda warnings.  See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619, 628 (1993); Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617.  Thus, we 
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And though ―the inference of guilt for failure to [make a 
statement] as to facts peculiarly within the accused‘s 
knowledge [may be] natural and irresistible‖ to a jury, 
―[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is 
one thing.  What it may infer when the court solemnizes the 
silence of the accused into evidence against him is quite 
another.‖  Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614.  
 
In short, the District Court‘s instruction permitted the 
jury to infer that Waller had the requisite intent to deliver the 
heroin from the fact that he exercised his right to remain 
silent after receiving his Miranda warnings.  This is precisely 
what the Fifth Amendment, as explicated in Doyle, forbids.
  
 
C. 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, we recognize that 
―[n]ot all errors mandate reversal.  When the error found is of 
a constitutional nature, a court may nonetheless uphold the 
conviction if the error was ‗harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt.‘‖  United States v. Korey, 472 F.3d 89, 96 (3d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 
(1993)).   
 
Though the harmless error analysis leaves room for 
certain convictions to stand, regardless of the presence of 
constitutional error at trial, it places a decidedly heavy burden 
on the Government to demonstrate that reversal is not 
warranted.  Having sustained a violation of his Fifth 
                                                                                                     
cannot fathom how the absence of such evidence in the record 
could bear on the propriety of the instruction given.  
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Amendment rights, Waller is entitled to a new trial unless the 
Government can ―prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error complained of did not contribute to the verdict 
obtained.‖  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.  In the particular 
context presented here, we have said that ―[a] verdict may 
still stand, despite erroneous jury instructions [on the issue of 
intent], where the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, 
so that no rational jury could find that the defendant did not 
intend [the criminal act charged].‖  Korey, 472 F.3d at 96-97 
(quotation marks omitted).   
 
The evidence of intent presented at trial can be 
summarized as follows.  The prosecution posited that 
Waller‘s possession of fifty-two stamp bags of heroin and a 
loaded revolver indicated possession for sale, not for personal 
use.  The Government also relied on the expert testimony of 
Trooper Warfield.  Trooper Warfield estimated each stamp 
bag would sell for between $10.00 and $20.00.  He stated that 
he had ―never met no one who was addicted to heroin to have 
fifty-two bags,‖ and he opined that in his experience a user of 
heroin does not commonly possess a firearm, but that a drug 
dealer would carry a firearm to protect himself, his drugs and 
his money.  During the search incident to the arrest, the police 
did not find any paraphernalia for injecting heroin 
intravenously.  Nor did they locate any track marks on 
Waller‘s body.  Based on this circumstantial evidence, the 
Government argued that Waller must have possessed the 
drugs for the purpose of dealing them. 
 
The defense similarly relied on circumstantial 
evidence to demonstrate that Waller intended the heroin for 
personal use and not for sale.  The police stopped Waller at 
the end of the night and he had no U.S. currency in his 
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possession.  The defense suggested that the absence of cash 
undermined the Government‘s theory that he had been selling 
heroin and bolstered the theory that he had just spent all of his 
cash buying the heroin that he now possessed.  Although 
Trooper Warfield had never encountered a heroin addict with 
fifty-two stamp bags in his possession, he also explained to 
the jury that an addict could use five to ten bags a day.  Thus, 
fifty-two bags is essentially one week‘s worth of heroin for an 
addict, and there were two people in the car.  Trooper 
Warfield also noted that good customers might be given extra 
stamp bags in a bundle.  One of the five bundles in Waller‘s 
possession had two extra stamp bags.  And although Trooper 
Warfield stated that drug users do not commonly possess 
firearms, he later qualified this testimony, explaining that 
drug users often possess firearms in order to trade them for 
drugs.  Finally, the defense challenged the significance of the 
fact that Waller had no paraphernalia for injecting heroin and 
exhibited no track marks from heroin injections.  The defense 
noted that a heroin snorter would not need such paraphernalia 
and neither would a snorter have track marks.  Instead, the 
defense pointed to the absence of evidence of packaging and 
dealing paraphernalia as substantially undermining the 
Government‘s theory that Waller was a dealer. 
 
This body of wholly circumstantial evidence, viewed 
in its entirety, is simply not the kind of overwhelming 
evidence of guilt that would readily lead us to find that the 
―guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely 
unattributable to the error.‖  Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279 
(emphasis omitted).  It is rather easy to see how the erroneous 
instruction might, in fact, have contributed to the jury‘s 
verdict:  in the face of equivocal evidence of Waller‘s intent, 
the jurors were invited by the District Court to consider the 
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statements that he failed to make.  And a juror could have 
plausibly decided that, if Waller merely intended to use the 
heroin rather than sell it, he would have said as much to the 
police prior to trial, since he was ready and willing to admit to 
this simple possession during trial.  To such a juror, the fact 
that Waller failed to explain his possession of the heroin after 
he was arrested would be substantive evidence of his guilt.  In 
light of the District Court‘s instruction on intent, this juror 
could reasonably have believed that such an omission on 
Waller‘s part was exactly the type of substantive evidence he 
or she was meant to consider.   
 
Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that 
the District Court‘s erroneous instruction was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  Waller is, therefore, entitled to a 
new trial.
7
 
 
IV. 
 
  For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the judgment 
of conviction and remand for a new trial.  
 
                                              
7
 Waller additionally claims that he is entitled to a new trial 
because of prosecutorial misconduct.  Specifically, he argues 
that statements related to sentencing and juror anonymity, 
which the prosecutor made during closing arguments, 
significantly burdened his rights under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments so as to render his trial unfair.  We need not 
pass on the import of these statements because we conclude 
that Waller is entitled to a new trial on other grounds.  
